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Abstract - Nowadays with the help of advanced technology, modern vehicles are not only made up of mechanical devices 
but also consist of highly complex electronic devices and connections to the outside world. There are around 70 Electronic 
Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicle which are communicating with each other over the standard communication 
protocol known as Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) that provides the communication rate up to 1Mbps. There are 
different types of in-vehicle network protocol and bus system namely Controlled Area Network (CAN), Local 
Interconnected Network (LIN), Media Oriented System Transport (MOST), and FlexRay. Even though CAN-Bus is 
considered as de-facto standard for in-vehicle network communication, it inherently lacks the fundamental security features 
by design like message authentication.  This security limitation has paved the way for adversaries to penetrate into the 
vehicle network and do malicious activities which can pose a dangerous situation for both driver and passengers.  In 
particular, nowadays vehicular networks are not only closed systems, but also they are open to different external interfaces 
namely Bluetooth, GPS, to the outside world. Therefore, it creates new opportunities for attackers to remotely take full 
control of the vehicle. The objective of this research is to survey the current limitations of CAN-Bus protocol in terms of 
secure communication and different solutions that researchers in the society of automotive have provided to overcome the 
CAN-Bus limitation on different layers.  
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1. Introduction 
he Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) protocol 
was introduced in 1983 by Robert BOSCH GmbH 
and has been widely applied in the automotive 
communication and even in domestic appliances, medical 
devices, and entertainment domains. [1].  Compared to the 
TCP/IP protocol in which the origin and destination 
addresses are defined in each packet, CAN-Bus messages 
does not have origin and destination address and instead it 
utilizes the broadcasting communication technique in such 
a way that each node in network can send and receive 
packets to/from bus.  
 
 
 
 
Since there is no destination address in CAN-Bus, each 
node can publish and receive particular messages based on 
the pre-defined node (here ECU) configuration. This 
communication technique increases the network elasticity 
[2] which means that if new ECU is supposed to add to the 
current network, it will be configured easily and does not 
require any changes to the network infrastructure and other 
nodes as well. CAN-Bus is event trigger protocol which 
means a message is generated in reply to the generation of 
event or request in the network. CAN-Bus is considered as 
multi-master protocol that defines if the communication 
bus is free, any node can publish/receive message on the 
bus and the latency time is guaranteed as well. Vehicular 
T 
  
network has introduced a variety of merits such as 
reducing harness in large extent, establishing data sharing, 
remarkably improving the intelligent control level of 
vehicle e.g. Advanced Driving Assistant Systems (ADAS), 
improving capabilities of failure diagnosis and repair and 
so on. 
To meet the real-time systems deadline requirements, each 
message has been assigned an identifier frame which is 
utilized to define the message priority [3]. The lower 
number of message identification value, the higher priority 
it has to gain the bus. This prioritization feature has also 
solved the bus access conflict in such a way that if two 
nodes want to send data simultaneously, each ECU which 
has a lower ID value will publish the message firstly. (Due 
to the higher priority). This technique is also known as 
message arbitration. [2]. Generally, CAN regulates 
arbitration in a predictable and efficient manner. Figure 1 
depicts a situation that three nodes (First node: 
11001011111 in binary, second node: 110011111111 in 
binary, and third node 110010110010 in binary) try to 
transmit message simultaneously. In order to prevent bus 
collision, a given node with the lowest ID (in this case 
third node) will transmit the information because it has a 
lowest value and highest priority than the other two nodes. 
Figure 1 depicts the message arbitration of this scenario. 
 
Fig. 1. Arbitration condition in CAN-Bus protocol. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents an overview of CAN-bus protocol. Section 3 
discusses the CAN-Bus protocol vulnerabilities. Section 4 
provides a state-of-the-art survey in the area of CAN-Bus 
security and authentication techniques and finally the paper 
is concluded in Section 5.  
 
2. CAN-Bus Protocol – an overview 
Before discussing the security vulnerabilities of CAN-Bus 
protocol, in this section an overview of CAB-Bus protocol 
is provided. Generally, there are two formats of CAN-Bus: 
standard format which has 11-bit for identifier and 
extended-format which includes 29-bit identifier frame. 
Data Frame, Remote Frame, overload frame, and error 
frame are four major frame types in controlled area 
network (CAN-Bus). Data Frame is used to carry the data 
from a transmitter to a receiver, which consists of the 
following bit fields: start of frame, (one dominant bit), 
arbitration field which consists of 12 bits, control field 
which has 6 bit, and data field (in range of 0 to 64 bytes), 
CRC field (16-bit), ACK field (2-bit), and End of Frame 
(7-bit). The complete illustration of data frame is shown in 
Figure 2. Arbitration field defines the priority of each 
message and also there is a single bit in this field to define 
whether this is a data frame or remote frame. [4] Remote 
frame is used to enable the receiver to request another data 
from transmitter. The data frame can be in the length of 
zero (remote frame) to eight bytes and control field 
specifies the length of the data frame. CRC frame: CRC 
frame consists of 16 bits totally; 15 bits are used for Cyclic 
Redundant Checksum algorithm for error detection and 
one recessive bit as delimiter. ACK field: Receiver node 
re-computes the CRC and if it matches, it reports this to 
the transmitter that the valid message has been received 
correctly. It is done by overwriting the recessive bit (logic 
1) in ACK slot with the dominant bit (logic 0) [4]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. CAN-Bus data frame 
 
Bit stuffing technique is used in CAN-Bus which indicates that if 
there are six consecutive identical bits transmitted in the bus, it is 
considered as an error because bit stuffing law is violated [5].  
Bit stuffing can be applied in different frames in CAN-Bus e.g. 
arbitration field, control field, and CRC field which means a 
complementary bit will be added to the frame when the 
transmitter finds that there are five identical bits consecutively. 
Therefore, six consecutive identical bits during the transmission 
is considered as bit-stuffing violation and error frame will be 
transmitted by each node which detects this situation. In Figure 3 
the CAN frame and how bit stuffing is applied to the frame is 
shown. 
 
Figure 3. Bit stuffing technique in CAN-Bus. 
 
 CAN-Bus consists of three major layers namely physical 
layer, transfer layer, and object layer. Physical layer 
includes the actual bit transfer between different nodes and 
the electrical properties of transmission and also the 
medium which is used for communication [6].  
CAN-Bus communication channel consists of twisted pair 
wires knowns as CAN-High and CAN-Low.  There are two 
different state for bit transmission e.g. recessive logical “1” 
and dominant logical “0”. After the CAN packet is passed 
from the CAN interface, the CAN transceiver 
(transmitter/receiver) converts the packet into a differential 
signal for transmission over the twisted pair wire. Most of 
the automotive communication protocol utilize the physical 
differential signaling specified in ISO 11898-2 – High 
speed CAN up to 1Mbps [7].   When a recessive bit 
(logical 1) is transmitted, both CAN-High and CAN-Low 
wires carry 2.5 V which means the voltage difference 
becomes zero On the other hand, during the transmission 
of dominant (logical 0) bit, CAN-High increases its voltage 
by 1 V, resulting in 3.5 V on CAN-High and CAN-Low 
voltage decreases its voltage by 1, resulting in 1.5 V on 
CAN-Low which means the voltage difference between 
CAN-High and CAN-Low becomes 2 volts.  Figure 4 
illustrates CAN-Bus voltage level. In this way the average 
voltage on the wire is always 2.5 V, making CAN-Bus very 
resilient against electric and magnetic interference. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CAN-Bus differential signal illustration. 
 
Connecting the vehicular networks to different 
environments, both internal networks and wireless, creates 
fantastic services for the automotive industry in terms of 
efficiency, cost and safety e.g. Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), 
and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication, 
Firmware-Update-Over-The-Air (FOTA) and remote 
diagnostics that enables embedded software components to 
be re-programed remotely and provides advantages for 
drivers in a way that they do not need to bring the vehicle 
to dealer for diagnostic services. [8].  However, these 
features can introduce new challenges because both 
internal and external communication needs to be secured 
properly otherwise attackers can take full control of the 
vehicle and endanger the passengers’ life consequently by 
misusing these features. 
3. CAN-Bus Protocol Vulnerabilities 
The CAN-bus protocol was designed to be lightweight, 
robust, and fast as it should be capable of having 
satisfactory performance in real-time environment and 
meet the time constraints [9]. However, CAN-Bus contains 
several vulnerabilities which are included in its design and 
has paved the way for adversaries to have access to the 
network and inject malicious message for different 
purposes.  From security solution standpoint, a secure 
communication should meet these five criteria by protocol 
or system security designer [10]: 
 
 Data Integrity: information which is received by 
the receiver should be exactly the same as sender 
has sent in channel without any alternation.  
 
 Authentication: all parties (ECUs in CAN-Bus) 
should be detected that they are authenticated.  
 
 Confidentiality: the communication between 
authorized parties should be protected against 
unauthorized ones. 
  
 Nonrepudiation:  the security solution should 
prove that the parties in the communication 
cannot deny the authenticity of the message that 
was organized. 
  
 Availability: the security solution should ensure 
that the system availabilities throughout different 
circumstances are guaranteed.  
 
One of the inherent limitation of CAN-Bus, which makes 
the nodes in network to be compromised, is the lack of 
message authentication within each CAN message. As its 
name implies, CAN-Bus is a network of different 
controllers with different functionalities. For instance, 
Engine Control Unit is sending the RPM data continuously 
to the bus and it becomes available for all the nodes in 
CAN-Bus, irrespective of whether nodes in the bus have 
requested that message or not. The other nodes constantly 
listen to the bus for their specific message which can be 
recognized by the message identifier. The CAN-Bus 
architecture works fine in the normal circumstances. 
However, it does not provide security facilities by design 
to prevent unauthorized node from joining the 
communication and broadcast malicious messages to other 
nodes. These inherent vulnerabilities give the attacker a 
potential surface to send spoofed message after 
understanding the legitimate format of CAN-Bus, and each 
  
ECU can impersonate the other ECUs for replay attack 
which could create harmful consequences for vehicle 
occupant. Attackers passively listen to the bus to record 
different legitimate messages content for different 
functionalities and then he/she can inject their own 
messages to manipulate the vehicle functionalities [11]. 
 
Another vulnerability of the CAN-Bus protocol is the 
unencrypted traffic during the communication.  Encryption 
techniques never apply during the phase of protocol design 
since they can make overhead for real-time communication 
and this would be in contrast with the nature of the 
protocol (lightweight and fast). This problem makes 
surface straightforward for adversaries to sniff the traffic 
by simply buying a low-price hardware which can be 
connected to the CAN-Bus and passively sniff data and 
obviously without some forms of encryptions, message 
authenticity and integrity would not guarantee and then be 
able to perform malicious activities. Therefore, it is 
required to add some security level or plug-in to the 
current protocol to avoid these incidents [11]. 
 
Misuse of protocol is another reason that hacker can take 
advantage of it. For instance, as mentioned in the earlier 
part, CAN-Bus uses message arbitration to win the bus for 
data broadcasting when more than one node tries to send 
the data. A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack can be 
launched by using the message arbitration technique in a 
way that adversary sends a malicious message with the 
highest priority (lowest ID) continuously. Therefore, the 
data-bus will be occupied all the time by the compromised 
node and could resulted in system failure [12].   Nowadays, 
by emerging the machine learning and intelligent 
algorithms, several methods are proposed in various 
engineering application e.g. intelligent controller design 
for industrial robots [13-15], Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) [16-18], adaptive optimization algorithm [19-21], 
etc.  Machine learning algorithms have been widely used 
as a powerful mathematical tool to develop security 
solution in the area of vehicular networks [22-25].  
4. Related Work 
In this part, the state-of-the-art survey is carried out to 
discuss different approaches and solutions that researchers 
have proposed to make in-vehicle communication more 
secure.  Researchers have worked in different CAN-Bus 
layers to introduce security solutions.  Cho and Shin [26] 
proposed a clock skew based framework for ECU 
fingerprinting and use it for the development of Clock 
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  The proposed 
clock based fingerprinting method [26] exploited clock 
characteristic which exists in all digital systems: “tiny 
timing error known as clock skew”. The clock skew 
identification exploits uniqueness of the clock skew and 
clock offset which is used to identify a given ECU based 
on clock attributes of the sending ECU. The proposed 
method measures and leverages the periodic behavior of 
CAN-Bus messages to fingerprint each ECU in the 
network and then constructing a reference clock behavior 
of each ECU by using Recursive Least Square (RLS) 
algorithm. Based on the developed reference behavior, 
deviation from the baseline clock behavior would consider 
as abnormal behavior (ECU is compromised) with low rate 
of false positive error: 0.055%. Cho and Shin developed a 
prototype for the proposed IDS and demonstrated 
effectiveness of the proposed CIDS on three different 
vehicles e.g. Honda Accord, Toyota Camry, and a Dodge 
Ram. 
               
Wang et al [27]. propose a practical security framework 
for vehicular systems (VeCure), which can fundamentally 
solve the message authentication issue of the CAN bus. 
They validate the proposed method by developing a proof-
of-concept prototype using Fessscale automotive 
development board. In their method each node which 
sends a CAN packet needs to send the message 
authentication code packet (8 bytes) as well. They divided 
the ECUs into two categories namely Low-trust group and 
High-trust group. ECUs which have external interfaces e.g. 
OBD-II or telematics are put in the low-trust group. High-
trust group share a secret symmetric key to authenticate 
each coming and outgoing messages in a way that an ECU 
from Low-trust group that does not know the key cannot 
send message to critical ECUs in high-trust group. Wang et 
al. used SHA-3 hash function but they improve the system 
throughput by pre-calculating of the heavy weighted 
cryptographic function.  The proposed method creates 
2000 additional clock cycle compared to the system 
without message authentication technique (equals to the 50 
micro second by running on the 40 MHz processor). By 
offline pre-calculating the hash function their method is 
20-fold faster computationally than the other methods 
which uses message authentication solutions.  Figure 5 
depicts the proposed method, CAN-Bus without message 
authentication, and classic SHA-3 hash function in terms 
of number of CPU clock cycles that they consume. 
  
Figure 5. No. of CPU cycle of CAN-Bus without message authentication, 
VeCure, and classic SHA-3 hash function. 
 
Koscher et al. [28] carried out a comprehensive 
experimental analysis of vehicle attack surfaces. They have 
analyzed different threat models and vulnerabilities with 
different range of vectors e.g. diagnostics mechanics 
sessions in which the adversary has a physical access to the 
bus via OBD-II port and by running a program on laptop to 
inject malware to the CAN-Bus. Infotainment systems in 
modern car have introduced several fascinating features e.g. 
connecting to the internet, cellphone, importing all the 
cellphone log to the infotainment screen like contact lists, 
etc.  These features open a new surface for attackers to 
inject the malware in an audio file and by playing the 
modified audio file, the infotainment systems can be 
comprised and finally the attacker can steal the logged data 
which have saved at infotainment systems.  Koscher et al. 
also examine both short rage wireless access e.g. Bluetooth, 
remote key less entry, RFID, and long range wireless e.g. 
GPS and satellite radio.  They perform different attacks 
with the help of these surfaces. For instance, they 
manipulated the WMA audio file in a way that it is played 
perfectly on PC. However, in the background it sends 
CAN-Bus messages when the CD is played by the victim 
vehicle. The question which might come up to the mind is 
that why car manufactures do not consider these 
vulnerabilities during the CAN-Bus development? Koscher 
et al. discussed that vehicles had not been targeted for 
these types of attacks and on that time there were not as 
diverse surfaces of communication as we have nowadays. 
But vehicles nowadays as connected with several short-
range and large-range wireless network and by introducing 
V2V & V2I communication this trend is continuingly 
growing and consequently the opportunities for attackers 
would be more provided and in-vehicle network 
vulnerabilities will be increased as well.  
 
Paar et al. [29] researchers from the Germany presented 
that the remote keyless entry which is becoming 
predominant feature for modern vehicles can be comprised 
and they can break the system based on the Keeloq RFID 
technology. This vulnerability can be applied to all remote 
keyless entry or other remote building access control 
systems which use Keeloq as cipher.  They showed that the 
key less remote access can be compromised from a 
distance of 100 meters. Theoretically, the car generates 
random value which will be processed by the remote 
keyless module and by matching the correct calculation the 
car door will be open. Replay attacks are not allowed by 
the security protocol that even an adversary records all 
communication between two parties and try to impersonate 
one of the parties later on, the replay of the log file does 
not allow him to open the door. However, Paar et al. 
applied the side channel attack of these systems.  
 
Hoppe et al. [30] performed four different tests on the 
control of window lift, warning light, airbag control 
systems and central gateway. They also classified and 
summarized their result in the CERT taxonomy for the 
security penetration and vulnerabilities of each part and 
analyze two selected counter-measures. They provide some 
short-term and long-term solution and believe the short-
term solutions can adopt into the current vehicle electronic 
systems but for the long-term solution some major 
alternation in the protocol design is required. For instance, 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) and data analysis is 
introduced as short-term security solution.   In the first 
scenario the electric window lift is targeted in the CANoe 
(simulation software by Vector CANTech company) in 
which the vehicular network is simulated and when a 
predefined condition is met (car speed goes beyond 200 
km/h) by adding some lines of malicious codes, the electric 
window lift automatically is opened and will not close until 
the end of attack. This attack lies down on the “Read” and 
“Spoof” method to monitor the current traffic and when it 
reaches the specified condition, it spoofs the command for 
electric window lift and finally Denial of Service will be 
performed and does not allow driver to halt the attack 
when it is running. Hackers use the vulnerabilities of CAN-
Bus since the messages are not authenticated during the 
communication and the malicious code is sent from the 
unauthorized ECU. 
For the second scenario, Hoppe et al. target the warning 
lights (indicators). In the normal circumstances, when 
unauthorized opening of a door happens, the 
corresponding door sensor will send message to the ECU 
and some events will be triggers e.g. generating light and 
horn alarm for a couple of seconds.  In this scenario when 
hacker opens vehicle door, the triggered “on” alarm will be 
set to “off” immediately which leads to turning off the light 
bulb and horn switched off and thief can steal the car or the 
items from the interior without any alarm. Again this 
vulnerability lies down on the CAN-Bus architecture 
communication (no message authentication) and this is 
“read” and “spoof” attack action and Denial of Service 
(DoS) as well.  In the third scenario Hoppe et al. analyze 
  
the air bag control system. In this attack scenario, the air 
bag module will be removed from the system which leads 
to dire consequence during the car accident (air bog does 
not work in emergency cases). They believe that the 
intention of this attack can be monetary goals because after 
air bag deploys in the accident, its substitution could be 
costly. This attack scenario can be done by a compromised 
powertrain subnetwork ECU or by connecting a hardware 
to the OBD-II port. Additionally, they controlled the air 
bag controller indicator that does not indicate the air bag 
failure anymore. In table 1 the CERT classification of three 
aforementioned scenarios are summarized:  
 
Table 1.  CERT Classification of three attack scenarios 
Scenario Attacker Vulnerability Action  Target  Result 
Electric 
window 
system 
Hackers 
By 
injecting 
the 
malicious 
code  
CAN bus 
protocol 
no  
message 
authentication  
Read/ 
spoof 
Control 
Unit 
(e.g. 
right 
door) 
Blocking 
of the 
window 
system 
(DoS) 
Warning 
lights 
(indicators) 
Thieves 
by 
injecting 
malicious 
code  
CAN bus 
protocol  
no  
message 
authentication 
Read/ 
spoof 
Control 
Unit 
(ECU) 
Blocking 
of the 
warning 
light 
system 
(DoS) 
Air bag 
control 
system  
Re-seller 
By 
injecting 
malicious 
code 
(OBD-II) 
port 
CAN bus 
protocol  
no  
message 
authentication 
Read/ 
Spoof  
Copy  
Air bag 
ECU  
Theft of 
resources 
(airbag 
function) 
 
One of the short-term countermeasure is developing the 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). When a malicious 
activity or network pattern is detected by an intelligent 
detection system, it should create some alarm or warning to 
limit the consequences of the attack. e.g. stop the car at the 
next safe position. One capability that an IDS is detecting 
the message frequency. For instance, in scenario 1 & 2 the 
corresponding messages send in a constant frequency from 
a specified identifier.  Attacker basically tries to send the 
exact identifier but with different content. Since removing 
the existing message is hard to achieve, therefore adversary 
will try to send the altered message with the same identifier 
within the significantly higher frequency. Hence, if the IDS 
can detect the high frequency of suspicious activity, it can 
create some warning alarm to the driver accordingly. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, in-vehicle network communication protocol 
CAN-Bus and its corresponding vulnerabilities are 
introduced. Several researchers have performed to show its 
corresponding weaknesses in terms of penetrations to the 
network. Although some researchers proposed security 
solutions for the current protocol, most of the work in this 
area are carried out to introduce the current problems and 
their solutions are not comprehensive. Developing security 
solution in physical layer security would have more merits 
compared to transfer layer because one of the challenges 
for developing security mechanism in the transfer layer 
(applying message authentication code) is the limitation of 
computational power and memory of the microcontrollers 
which could be insufficient to develop a cryptographic 
algorithm for CAN-Bus in real-time environment. Vehicles 
are being revolutionized by integrating modern computing 
and communication technologies in order to improve both 
user experience and driving safety. As a result, vehicular 
systems that used to be closed systems are opening up 
various interfaces, such as Bluetooth, 3G/4G, GPS, etc., to 
the outside world. One of the root vulnerabilities of CAN-
Bus is that there is no message authentication code for the 
communication which paves the way for adversaries to 
penetrate to the bus.  It seems that by introducing the V2V 
and V2I communication, which increase external interfaces, 
the in-vehicle network communication protocol needs to be 
redesigned to boost the security aspect of the protocol or 
the more secured protocol e.g. Ethernet should be utilized 
more for in-vehicle network communication. 
  
 
References 
[1]  CAN-Bus Specifications Rep. Robert Bosch GmbH. Postfach 
50, D-7000. Stuttgart 1Print. 
 
[2] Kaiser, J., & Mock, M. (1999). Implementing the real-time 
publisher/subscriber model on the controller area network 
(CAN). In Object-Oriented Real-Time Distributed 
Computing, 1999.(ISORC'99) Proceedings. 2nd IEEE 
International Symposium on (pp. 172-181). IEEE. 
 
[3] Hafeez, A., Malik, H., Avatefipour, O., Rongali, P. et al., 
"Comparative Study of CAN-Bus and FlexRay Protocols for 
In-Vehicle Communication," SAE Technical Paper 2017-01-
0017, 2017. 
 
[4] Corrigan, Steve. Introduction to the Controller Area Network 
(CAN). Rep. Texas Instrument. Print. 
 
[5] Farsi, M., Ratcliff, K., & Barbosa, M. (1999). An overview of 
controller area network. Computing & Control Engineering 
Journal, 10(3), 113-120. 
 
[6] Hesse, Scott, William Nicolay, Hugh Adamson, and John 
McDermid. "Can bus router for building automation 
systems." U.S. Patent Application 11/216,685, filed August 
31, 2005. 
 
[7] Ran, P., Wang, B., & Wang, W. (2008, April). The design of 
communication convertor based on CAN bus. In Industrial 
Technology, 2008. ICIT 2008. IEEE International 
Conference on (pp. 1-5). IEEE. 
  
[8] Shavit, M., Gryc, A., & Miucic, R. (2007). Firmware update 
over the air (FOTA) for automotive industry (No. 2007-01-
3523). SAE Technical Paper. 
 
[9] Tindell, K., & Burns, A. (1994, September). Guaranteeing 
message latencies on control area network (CAN). 
In Proceedings of the 1st International CAN Conference. 
Citeseer. 
 
[10] Stallings, W., & Tahiliani, M. P. (2014). Cryptography and     
network security: principles and practice (Vol. 6). London: 
Pearson. 
 
[11] Nilsson, D. K., Larson, U. E., Picasso, F., & Jonsson, E. 
(2009). A first simulation of attacks in the automotive 
network communications protocol flexray. In Proceedings of 
the International Workshop on Computational Intelligence in 
Security for Information Systems CISIS’08 (pp. 84-91). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 
[12] Lin, C. W., & Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, A. (2012, 
December). Cyber-security for the Controller Area Network 
(CAN) communication protocol. In Cyber Security 
(CyberSecurity), 2012 International Conference on (pp. 1-7). 
IEEE.  
 
[13] Khalilian, A., Sahamijoo, G., Avatefipour, O., Piltan, F., & 
Nasrabad, M. R. S. (2014). Design high efficiency-minimum 
rule base PID like fuzzy computed torque 
controller. International Journal of Information Technology 
and Computer Science (IJITCS), 6(7), 77. 
 
[14] Khalilian, A., Piltan, F., Avatefipour, O., Nasrabad, M. R. S., 
& Sahamijoo, G. (2014). Design New Online Tuning 
Intelligent Chattering Free Fuzzy Compensator. International 
Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications, 6(9), 75. 
 
[15] Sahamijoo, G., Avatefipour, O., Nasrabad, M. R. S., 
Taghavi, M., & Piltan, F. (2015). Research on minimum 
intelligent unit for flexible robot. International Journal of 
Advanced Science and Technology, 80, 79-104. 
 
[16] Sinclair, C., Pierce, L., & Matzner, S. (1999). An 
application of machine learning to network intrusion 
detection. In Computer Security Applications Conference, 
1999.(ACSAC'99) Proceedings. 15th Annual (pp. 371-377). 
IEEE. 
 
[17] Avatefipour, O., Hafeez, A., Tayyab, M., & Malik, H. 
(2017). Linking Received Packet to the Transmitter Through 
Physical-Fingerprinting of Controller Area 
Network . Information Forensics and Security (WIFS 
Conference, Rennes, France. 
 
[18] Shon, T., Kim, Y., Lee, C., & Moon, J. (2005, June). A 
machine learning framework for network anomaly detection 
using SVM and GA. In Information Assurance Workshop, 
2005. IAW'05. Proceedings from the Sixth Annual IEEE 
SMC (pp. 176-183). IEEE. 
 
[19] Mokhtar, M., Piltan, F., Mirshekari, M., Khalilian, A., & 
Avatefipour, O. (2014). Design minimum rule-base fuzzy 
inference nonlinear controller for second order nonlinear 
system. International Journal of Intelligent Systems and 
Applications, 6(7), 79. 
 
[20] Avatefipour, O., Piltan, F., Nasrabad, M. R. S., Sahamijoo, 
G., & Khalilian, A. (2014). Design New Robust Self Tuning 
Fuzzy Backstopping Methodology. International Journal of 
Information Engineering and Electronic Business, 6(1), 49. 
[21] Shahcheraghi, A., Piltan, F., Mokhtar, M., Avatefipour, O., 
& Khalilian, A. (2014). Design a Novel SISO Off-line 
Tuning of Modified PID Fuzzy Sliding Mode 
Controller. International Journal of Information Technology 
and Computer Science (IJITCS), 6(2), 72. 
 
[22] Ramadan, M. N., Al-Khedher, M. A., & Al-Kheder, S. A. 
(2012). Intelligent anti-theft and tracking system for 
automobiles. International Journal of Machine Learning and 
Computing, 2(1), 83. 
 
[23] Müter, M., & Asaj, N. (2011, June). Entropy-based anomaly 
detection for in-vehicle networks. In Intelligent Vehicles 
Symposium (IV), 2011 IEEE (pp. 1110-1115). IEEE. 
 
[24] Müter, M., Groll, A., & Freiling, F. C. (2010, August). A 
structured approach to anomaly detection for in-vehicle 
networks. In Information Assurance and Security (IAS), 
2010 Sixth International Conference on (pp. 92-98). IEEE. 
 
[25] Narayanan, S. N., Mittal, S., & Joshi, A. (2015). Using data 
analytics to detect anomalous states in vehicles. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1512.08048. 
 
[26] Cho, Kyong-Tak, and Kang G. Shin. "Fingerprinting 
electronic control units for vehicle intrusion detection." 25th 
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16). 
USENIX Association, 2016. 
 
[27] Q. Wang and S. Sawhney, "VeCure: A practical security 
framework to protect the CAN bus of vehicles," 2014 
International Conference on the Internet of Things (IOT), 
Cambridge, MA, 2014, pp.13-18.doi: 
10.1109/IOT.2014.7030108 
 
[28] Experimental security analysis of a modern automobile K 
Koscher, A Czeskis, F Roesner, S Patel, T Kohno - 2010 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2010 
 
[29] Eisenbarth, T. Kasper, A. Moradi, C. Paar, M. Salmasizadeh          
and M. Manzuri Shalmani. On the power of power analysis 
in the real world: A complete break of the KeeLoq code 
hopping scheme. In D. Wagner, editor, Proceedings of 
Crypto 2008, volume 5157 of LNCS, pages 203–20. 
Springer-Verlag, Aug. 2008. 
 
[30] Hoppe, T., Kiltz, S., & Dittmann, J. (2008). Security threats     
to automotive CAN networks–practical examples and 
  
selected short-term countermeasures. Computer Safety, 
Reliability, and Security, 235-248. 
 
 
Omid Avatefipour is currently pursuing his 
Master’s program in Computer Engineering at 
University of Michigan-Dearborn.  His research 
interests include in-vehicle network 
communication protocol security, Embedded 
Systems, Data mining, Intelligent Control 
systems and Robotics.  He has work 
experience at Vector CANTech company as 
Embedded Software Engineer and at Valeo North Amercia 
company as System Software Engineer in Advanced Engineering 
Research & Development department. He has also worked as 
researcher in Information System, Security, and Forensics (ISSF) 
laboratory at Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
(ECE), University of Michigan – Dearborn. Additionally, he was 
working as primary researcher in the laboratory of Control and 
Robotics at institute of Advanced Science and Technology, IRAN 
SSP Research & Development center.  
 
Hafiz Malik is Associate Processor in the 
Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) 
Department at University of Michigan – 
Dearborn. His research in 
cybersecurity, multimedia forensics, 
information security, wireless sensor networks, 
steganography/ steganalysis, pattern 
recognition, information fusion, and biometric 
security is funded by the National Academies, 
National Science Foundation and other 
agencies. He has published more than 70 papers in leading 
journals, conferences, and workshops. He is serving as Associate 
Editor for the IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and 
Security since August 2014 and for the Springer Journal of Signal, 
Image, and Video Processing (SIVP) May 2013 – present. He is 
also on the Review Board Committee of IEEE Technical 
Committee on Multimedia Communications (MMTC). He 
organized Special Track on Doctoral Dissertation in Multimedia, in 
the 6th IEEE International Symposium on Multimedia (ISM) 2006. 
He is also organizing a special session on “Data Mining in 
Industrial Applications” within the IEEE Symposium Series on 
Computational Intelligence (IEEE SSCI) 2013.  He is serving as 
vice chair of IEEE SEM, Chapter 16 since 2011. He is also serving 
on several technical program committees, including the IEEE 
AVSS, ICME ICIP, MINES, ISPA, CCNC, ICASSP, and ICC. He is 
a senior IEEE member. 
